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INTRODUCTION
Chicago has been subject to much criticism over its aggressive
vehicle impoundment program and excessive fines for traffic
violations outlined in title 9 of its Municipal Code.1 Upon receiving
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Chicago–Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. My utmost gratitude to the Honorable Timothy A. Barnes, Professors
Adrian Walters and Steven Harris, Lauren Hiller, and Nicholas Ballen for their
considerable guidance and teaching me almost everything I know about bankruptcy,
insolvency, and secured transactions. A special thanks as well to Ross Greenspan for
our discussions. All errors are my own.
1 Municipal Code of Chicago, tit. 9, ch. 4–124 (1990) (hereinafter “M.C.C.”)
(available at:
“http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/municipalcodeofchica
go?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il”). The stated purpose
of Chicago’s traffic enforcement policy is to “provide for the administrative
adjudication of violations of ordinances defining compliance, automated speed
enforcement system, and automated traffic law enforcement system violations and
regulating vehicular standing and parking within the city.” Id. at § 9-100-010.
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notice of a traffic violation, an individual has seven days to either
admit liability by paying the fine or request a hearing to contest the
violation.2 The failure to respond results in the “entry of a
determination of liability against such individual[,]” with such
determination constituting “a debt due and owing the [C]ity.”3 If a
vehicle owner has two or more determinations of liability, the City can
impound his vehicle.4 Further, the City adds additional fines for each
day the vehicle remains immobilized until the owner redeems by
paying the traffic fine debt in full, in addition to the fees associated
with towing and storage, and reimbursing the city for its efforts to
collect on the outstanding debt.5
In order to address this spiral of scofflaw debt, thousands of
Chicagoans each year file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief. These
debtors do not necessarily seek to discharge this debt, but rather intend
to file a plan to pay off their debts to all of their creditors over a period
of time. In doing so, the City immediately becomes obliged to turn
over their cars pursuant to Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.,6 where the Seventh Circuit held that the automatic stay
protection in the Bankruptcy Code7 works to return seized property
back to the debtor.8
In recent years, more circuits have joined in the issue, each
grappling with the language of section 362(a)(3), which prohibits “any
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”9 Though

2

Id. at § 9–100–050
Id.
4
Id. at §9–100–120.
5
Id. at § 9–92–080(a)-(b).
6
566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009).
7
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
8
Thompson, 566 F.3d at 711.
9
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
3

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/3

2

Yachik: “Dude, Where’s My Car?” A Look at How the Seventh Circuit Address

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

the automatic stay is unquestionably broad,10 the circuits are split as to
whether this provision also prohibits retaining possession of property
seized by a creditor before the bankruptcy filing.11
In 2016, Chicago tried to scheme around the Seventh Circuit’s
decision when it codified an ordinance granting the city a possessory
lien in every car impounds on account of outstanding traffic debt.12
Now armed with the rights of a secured creditor,13 the City openly
violated Thompson and began to refuse to turnover its immobilized
vehicles upon bankruptcy filings.
In 2019, In re Fulton14 afforded the Seventh Circuit the
opportunity to review the automatic stay in light of a growing circuit
split on the issue and a building tension in the bankruptcy courts
between Chicago and its constituents.15 There, the court relied on
precedent and the policy interests of the Bankruptcy Code to reiterate
that section 362(a)(3) commands the City to return immobilized
vehicles in its possession once their owners file for bankruptcy, even if
the City claims a possessory lien on them.16
This Note’s purpose is to analyze the automatic stay provision in
bankruptcy, giving insight into its statutory framework, purpose, and
effects, before ultimately concluding that the Seventh Circuit correctly
10

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(8).
Compare Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 81 (2d. Cir. 2013),
Thompson, 566 F.3d at 711, Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dept. v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.),
98 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1996), Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus),
889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989) with In re Denby–Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 119 (3d
Cir. 2019), In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2017) and United States v.
Inslaw, 932 F.2d 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
12
M.C.C., supra note 1, at § 9-92-080.
13
See infra notes 17–26 and the accompanying text therein.
14
926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019).
15
See, e.g., In re Steenes, 918 F.3d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 2019) (the City accusing
debtors of using bankruptcy as a sword to thwart traffic laws).
16
Fulton, 926 F.3d at 921–23.
11
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decided Fulton. This Note will first give a brief introduction to
bankruptcy law and security interests necessary to understand the
issues presented by the automatic stay and chapter 13 bankruptcy
relief. Second, this Note will address the automatic stay in detail
before surveying the approaches taken in the developing split on the
section 362(a)(3) issue. Third, this Note will discuss Fulton while
emphasizing differences in the Seventh Circuit’s approach in light of
recent decisions by other circuits. Last, in light of the Supreme Court
granting certiorari,17 this Note will assert that the Seventh Circuit
correctly decided Fulton and offer other justification in support.
BACKGROUND
Bankruptcy is a system of federal law governed entirely under the
Bankruptcy Code.18 Though not a requirement,19 an individual will
commonly declare bankruptcy once he becomes insolvent, or when his
debts exceed the sum of his assets.20 The process begins by the filing
of a petition for relief, upon which the debtor provides notice to all
creditors of the bankruptcy.21 Then, in order to be repaid, creditors of

17

In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom., City of
Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 680 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019) (No. 19-357).
18
Article One of the United States Constitution empowers Congress “to
establish . . . uniform [l]aws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4. The current bankruptcy laws are outlined in
Title 11 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012) (the “Bankruptcy
Code” or the “Code”). All section numbers referenced in this Comment and
accompanying notes herein refer to the Bankruptcy Code unless otherwise specified.
19
Insolvency is only a prerequisite for municipalities seeking to file for chapter
9 relief. Individual debtors seeking to file for relief under chapters 7, 11, or 13 do not
have to be insolvent at the time of filing. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (requires
municipalities to be insolvent to be eligible for chapter 9 relief) with 11 U.S.C. §
109(b) (prerequisites to file for chapter 7 relief); 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (prerequisites to
file for chapter 11 relief); and 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (prerequisites to file for chapter 13
relief).
20
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (defining insolvency).
21
11 § U.S.C. 109.
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the debtor must appear and file a proofs of claim in the amount of the
debt owed to them.22
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a claim represents a right to payment
the creditor has against the debtor.23 An important distinction is
whether the claim is secured or unsecured, which in turn relies on the
remedies available to the creditor upon default.24 Unsecured claims are
rights to payment against the debtor that are not secured by
collateral.25 Conversely, secured creditors possess some sort of
security in the debtor’s property that allows it a remedy to collect on
the collateral.26 Secured claims arise from liens, which are defined
under the Bankruptcy Code as a “charge against or interest in property
to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.”27
Further, a lien can be either consensual or nonconsensual,
depending on if such lien arises upon consent of the debtor pursuant to
a security agreement.28 Nonconsensual liens, like Chicago’s
immobilization ordinance, are generally created two ways, either by
statute, or by judgment. The former is considered a statutory lien,
which is defined under the Bankruptcy Code as a “lien arising solely
by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions . . .”29
22

11 § U.S.C. 501(a).
11 § U.S.C. 101(5). A claim also includes the “right to an equitable remedy
for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment . . . .” Id.
24
See generally BANKR. JUDGES DIV., ADMIN OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS, 21 at n.7 (Nov. 2011) (discussing secured claims
and unsecured claims) (hereinafter “BANKRUPTCY BASICS”) (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasics–post10172005.pdf). Those
possessing an unsecured claim are considered “unsecured creditors” while those
possessing a secured claim are “secured creditors.”
25
See generally id.
26
See generally id.
27
11 U.S.C. § 101(37).
28
11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (defining the term “security interest” to indicate “a lien
created by agreement.”).
29
11 U.S.C. § 101(53).
23
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The latter is a judicial lien, which is defined as a “lien obtained by
judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or
proceeding.”30
Once the claims are filed, the bankruptcy operates consistent with
equitable principles in the furtherance of one goal—to round up the
debtor’s assets and debts and distribute such assets in account of such
debts in an orderly fashion.31 Within the Bankruptcy Code are three
important concepts that act to further this goal––(1) the bankruptcy
estate; (2) turnover; and (3) adequate protection.
A.

Property of the Estate: Section 541(a)

Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, a bankruptcy estate32 is
created under section 541(a).33 The estate is unquestionably broad in
scope, as it consists of the “legal or equitable interests of the debtor.”34
The importance of the bankruptcy estate is best understood by
examining the differences amongst the available types of bankruptcy
30

11 U.S.C. § 101(36).
See, e.g., In re Glenn, 542 B.R. 833, 841 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (“Above
all, bankruptcy is a collective process, designed to gather together the assets and
debts of the debtor and to effect an equitable distribution of those assets on account
of the debts. The more participation there is; the better this process works.”)
(referencing Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir.
1989)).
32
The “estate” and “bankruptcy estate” are used interchangeably herein.
33
11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
34
Id.; see also Matter of Carousel Intern. Corp., 89 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir.
1996) (“[E]very conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory,
contingent, speculative, and derivative, is within the reach of § 541.”). The
Bankruptcy Code is the overriding authority to determine the extent of property of
the estate. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 11 (1924); c.f. In re
Barnes, 276 F.3d 927, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the debtor’s liquor license
was property of the estate despite the license not being considered property under
Indiana law, where the debtor filed for relief). Property rights, on the other hand, are
determined by state law. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
31
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relief. In chapter 7 cases, or “liquidation” proceedings, a bankruptcy
trustee is appointed in order to liquidate non–exempt35 property of the
estate.36 The proceeds of the liquidation are then distributed to the
unsecured creditors.37 After the estate property has been liquidated, the
bankruptcy case closes, and the debtor is granted a discharge of his
outstanding debts.38
Relief under Chapters 11 and 13, on the other hand, focus on
reorganizing the debtor’s affairs to address his debts.39 Chapter 11 is
commonly utilized by business entities, while Chapter 13 is commonly
used by individual debtors.40 Notwithstanding the preceding, the
premises of chapter 11 and chapter 13 are largely similar—the debtor
formulates a plan to use discretionary post-petition income to repay
creditors over a certain period time.41

35

The Code authorizes individual debtors to claim exemptions on certain kinds
of property in order to spare it from the liquidation process. See 11 U.S.C. § 522.
Common examples include homestead exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), an
exemption for household goods under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3), and an exemption for
certain employment benefits under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10).
36
See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 15, at 7.
37
Id. (stating that chapter 13 “is designed for an individual debtor with a
regular source of income . . . [while chapter 11] ordinarily is used by commercial
enterprises that desire to continue operating a business and repay creditors
concurrently through a court–approved plan of reorganization.”)
38
Id.
39
Id. at 7. Debtors under chapter 11 and chapter 13 retain their property and
utilize income earned after the bankruptcy petition (“postpetition”) to pay their debts
that accumulated before the bankruptcy filing (“prepetition”). Id.
40
Id. at 8.
41
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (chapter 13 debtors “must file a plan.”). The
requisite length of the plan generally depends on the income of the debtor. If the
debtor’s annual income is greater than the median income of the state in which he
filed, the plan cannot exceed five years. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(1). If the debtor’s
income is greater than that state’s median income, the plan cannot exceed three years
unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(2).
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In furtherance of an individual reorganization, Chapter 13 permits
debtors to retain possession of property of the estate.42 This applies to
property of the estate encumbered by security interests, including
mortgages and liens.43 However, in order for the plan to be approved
by the court, the debtor must treat the secured claims in the plan by
either (1) obtaining the secured creditors’ consent to the plan; (2)
proposing to pay the full amount of the secured claim and provide, if
applicable, “adequate protection” payments for the interests of the
secured creditor (commonly referred as “cramdown”); or (3)
surrendering the collateral to the secured creditor.44
B.

Turnover: Section 542(a)

At the outset of the bankruptcy case, there are times where
someone other than the debtor maybe be in possession of property of
the estate. Further compounding this issue is when the repossessed
asset would be of beneficial use to the bankruptcy estate. The
Bankruptcy Code addresses these situations in section 542, which
provides:
[A]n entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or
control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use,
sell, or lease . . . shall deliver to the trustee, and account for,

42

See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (recognizing the same
in chapter 11).
43
See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 15, at 22 (stating that “chapter 13
allows individuals to reschedule secured debts . . . and extend them over the life of
the chapter 13 plan.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (“By filing under this chapter,
individuals can stop foreclosure proceedings and may cure delinquent mortgage
payments over time.”).
44
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5). Section 1325 outlines the requirements for a court to
confirm a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325. If a plan cannot be
confirmed in a reasonable amount of time, a court may dismiss the bankruptcy case.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(5).
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such property or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.45
In essence, section 542 authorizes the “turnover” of estate
property held by parties other than the debtor.46 If turnover is a
contested matter, meaning there is a dispute over the legal or equitable
interests of the property at issue, a turnover action must be brought
under an adversary proceeding, which is a lawsuit separate from, but
related to, the underlying bankruptcy case.47 Turnover can be
incredibly important when the repossessed asset would be of
beneficial use to the bankruptcy estate.
C.

Adequate Protection: Sections 363(e) and 361

Though undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, the basic function of
adequate protection is to protect the secured creditor’s interest in
collateral during the pendency of the bankruptcy, especially upon the
risk of its interest in collateral decreasing.48 A good example of this
45

11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (emphasis added).
See id. Section 542 may be referred herein as the “turnover provision.”
47
See generally BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 15, at 37. Adversary
proceedings are governed under Rule 7001 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. A turnover action is generally brought under an
adversary proceeding because it is a “proceeding to recover money or property . . . .”
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(d); but see United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S.
198, 211 (1983) (stating that a chapter 11 debtor does not need to commence a
turnover action to recover property seized before the bankruptcy filing because such
property is property of the estate, and section 542 is self–executing in this scenario),
infra notes 62–87 and accompanying text. The commencement of an adversary
proceeding to recover property may be referred herein as a “turnover action.” A
chapter 13 debtor is allowed to commence a turnover action to recover property, but
there is a current split as to whether such debtor may avail itself to automatic
turnover of estate property (without commencing a turnover action) provided under
Whiting Pools. See infra notes 62–87 and accompanying text.
48
See generally Sydney G. Platzer & Son K. Le, When is a Secured Creditor
Entitled to Adequate Protection? An Emerging Trend, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, at
50 (May 2005) (stating that “[t]he very heart of the concept of adequate protection is
46
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can be seen with a mortgage, where the financer agrees to lend money
for the debtor to purchase a home, and in return receives a security
interest allowing it to take possession of and sell the property upon
default. Should the debtor default on the mortgage and then
subsequently file for bankruptcy, the automatic stay (as discussed
later) would prevent the immediate sale of the property.49 If the
bankruptcy filing occurred during a bearish real estate market, the
value of the home (as collateral) decreases each day the foreclosure
sale is stalled by the bankruptcy, thereby decreasing the amount of the
secured claim to be paid over the course of a Chapter 13 plan.50
In that scenario, the mortgagor would seek adequate protection of
its interest under section 363(e), which provides:
[A]t any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in
property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or
leased . . . the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit
or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of such interest.51
The words of the statute make clear that it is the creditor’s burden
to request for adequate protection.52 If such request is made, the debtor
must provide adequate protection of the concerned creditor’s interest
in order to use the collateral at issue during the plan term.53 Section
361 outlines the available methods to provide for adequate protection,

to assure the secured creditor that as the bankruptcy procedures unfold he will not be
faced with a decrease in value of his collateral.”).
49
See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
50
See supra notes 19–37 and accompanying text.
51
11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
52
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (stating that adequate protection is available at any
time “on request of an entity that has an interest in property . . . “) (emphasis added).
53
In order to cramdown the plan over the objection of a secured creditor, the
plan must provide for adequate protection of that creditor’s interest in the form of
payments over the plan period. See 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(b)(iii)(II).
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which include cash payments over the course of a plan or providing a
replacement lien.54
D.

Whiting Pools – Putting them Together

In United States v. Whiting Pools, the Supreme Court utilized the
foregoing when it examined whether section 542 authorized the
turnover of a Chapter 11 debtor’s property that was repossessed prior
the bankruptcy filing.55 In Whiting Pools, the IRS seized certain
equipment the debtor used in the course of its business, and in
response, the debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief.56 Seeking
to use the seized equipment in the reorganization of its business, the
debtor then brought a turnover action to have the IRS return the
property.57
The Court held that the repossessed property constituted property
of the estate and was subject to turnover on a self–executing basis
under section 542(a).58 Though the debtor did not have a possessory
interest in the property at the time of filing, the Court noted that the
debtor had an equitable interest in the property, and such interest was
unquestionably property of the estate.59 In order to promote the
furtherance of the debtor’s reorganization efforts,60 the Court reasoned
that section 542(a) effectively works to return the lost possessory
interest in the property to the debtor in order to use the property for the

54

11 U.S.C. § 361.
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 200–01 (1983).
56
Id. at 199 – 200. The IRS levied on the property pursuant to a federal tax
55

lien.
57

Id.
Id. at 204.
59
Id. at 203 (citing 11 U.S.C. 541(a)).
60
See id. at 200 (noting that the “going–concern’ value [the value of the
property in the use of the debtor’s business] of the seized property was over four
times the amount of the liqudation value).
58
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benefit of the estate.61 Though the IRS was effectively forced to give
up possession in compliance with the turnover provision, the Court
went on to note that it may seek adequate protection of its interest
once the estate retained the seized property.62
THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The automatic stay is perhaps the most important consequence of
filing for bankruptcy. Immediately upon the commencement of a
bankruptcy case, section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code enjoins creditors
from taking a variety of informal and formal actions by creditors to
collect on their debts against the debtor.63
The stay serves two essential purposes. First, it gives the debtor a
“breathing spell” against harassment from creditors seeking to collect
on their debts.64 Second, it bars the inevitable “race to the debtor’s
assets”—where the creditors flock to the courts to obtain judgment
liens—in order to place all creditors on a level playing field.65 Because
these purposes are unquestionably important to the collective nature of

61

Id. at 203–205. The Court utilized Congressional reports to note the broad
scope of the bankruptcy estate under 541(a)(1).
62
Id. at 203–204 (noting that Congress chose to include secured property in the
estate and to provide adequate protection to those who seek it); see also id. at 204
(stating that secured creditors must utilize adequate protection, “rather than the
nonbankruptcy remedy of possession.”).
63
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
64
H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 340 (1977) (“It gives the debtor a breathing spell
from its creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure
actions. It permits the debtor to . . . be relieved of financial pressures that drove him
into bankruptcy.”); see also Dean v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755
(9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing same).
65
See, e.g., In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that the
automatic stay protects “what remains of the debtor’s insolvent estate and provides a
systematic equitable liquidation procedure for all creditors . . . thereby preventing a
chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor’s assets”)
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bankruptcy, creditors who violate the automatic stay may be punished
with contempt sanctions.66
The stay under section 362(a) lists eight types of prohibited
creditor conduct.67 Part A of this section takes a close look at section
362(a), emphasizing section 362(a)(3), which prohibits “any act to
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate” by a creditor.68
Part B then discusses 362(b), which outlines the exceptions to the stay,
emphasizing section 362(b)(3).
A.

Section 362(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3) prohibits “any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise

66

11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
The stay prohibits: (1) “the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial,
administrative, or other action against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title”; (2) “the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title”; (3) “any
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to
exercise control over property of the estate”; (4) “any act to create, perfect, or
enforce any lien against property of the estate”; (5) “any act to create, perfect, or
enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title”; (6) “any act
to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title”; (7) “the setoff of any debt owing to the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any
claim against the debtor”; and (8) “the commencement or continuation of a
proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning a tax liability of a debtor
that is a corporation for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or
concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period
ending before the date of the order for relief under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(18).
68
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
67
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control over property of the estate.”69 Prior to 1984, section 362(a)(3)
applied to stay “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate
or of property of the estate,”70 and so only prohibited seizing the
debtor’s property after the bankruptcy case commenced. The
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 amended
the provision to apply to any act to “exercise control over property of
the estate.”71
In light of Whiting Pools, courts have pondered whether the 1984
amendment represented Congress’s tacit approval of the decision,
which has since lead to the position that sections 362(a)(3) and 542(a)
collectively place an affirmative obligation on creditor to turn over
seized estate property upon the filing of a petition.72 Courts are
currently split as to whether this “passive retention” is an act to
exercise control over such property, thus constituting a violation of the
automatic stay, with a slight majority finding in the affirmative.73
1.

The Majority View

The Second,74 Seventh,75 Eighth,76 and Ninth Circuits77 compose
the majority interpretation that section 362(a)(3) works collectively
69

Id.
See Eugene R. Wedoff, The Automatic Stay Under § 362(a)(3)—One More
Time, 38 NO. 7 BANKR. L. LETTER NL 1 (2018) (hereinafter “Wedoff”) (discussing
the history of section 362(a)(3)).
71
Id. (citing Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984)).
72
See Wedoff, supra note 64; see also In re Javens, 107 F.3d 359, 368 (6th Cir.
1997) (surveying courts).
73
Compare Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2013),
Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2009),
Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dept. v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th
Cir. 1996), and Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775
(8th Cir. 1989) with In re Denby–Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2019), In re
Cowen, 849 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Inslaw, 932 F.2d
1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
74
Weber, 719 F.3d at 81.
70

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/3

14

Yachik: “Dude, Where’s My Car?” A Look at How the Seventh Circuit Address

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

with section 542(a) to require the turnover of repossessed collateral
upon the bankruptcy filing. These circuits prioritize reading section
362(a) in accordance with two important policy goals of the
Bankruptcy Code—to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for
the benefit of all creditors and minimize the costs of the estate.78
The Seventh Circuit decided this question as a matter of first
impression in Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.79 In
Thompson, the debtor purchased a vehicle under an installment
contract that granted a purchase money security interest (a “PMSI”)80
in the car to a car dealership.81 The dealership repossessed the car after
the debtor defaulted on his payments and, in response, the debtor filed
for chapter 13 relief.82 Now in bankruptcy, the debtor requested that
the creditor return the vehicle to him.83 After the dealership refused to
75

Thompson, 566 F.3d at 703; see also In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 920 (7th
Cir. 2019) (declining to overrule Thompson).
76
Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775.
77
Taxel, 98 F.3d at 1151.
78
See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (stating that an “asset actively used by a
debtor serves a greater purpose to both the debtor and his creditors than sitting idle
on a creditor’s lot.”); see also Weber, 719 F.3d at 81 (citing Thompson), Taxel, 98
F.3d at 1151–52 (noting that to hold otherwise and require a debtor to commence a
turnover action to recover property “rightfully due to a bankruptcy estate is a very
real concern.”), Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775 (stating that the other creditors in the
bankruptcy should not have the financial burden associated with a turnover action of
property that rightfully belongs to the estate).
79
566 F.3d 699.
80
A purchase money security interest is a security interest where the purchased
goods serve as collateral that secures for the purchaser’s (or the debtor’s) obligation
to pay for such goods. U.C.C. § 9–103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2000). An installment contract is a common example. The dealership sells the car on
credit to the purchaser, and in consideration, the dealership is granted a security
interest in the car to secure the purchaser’s obligation to make payments on the
vehicle. For a general background on consensual security interests, see generally
supra notes 10–23 and accompanying text.
81
Thompson, 566 F.3d at 700–01.
82
Id. at 701.
83
Id.
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turn over the car back to the debtor, the debtor moved for sanctions.84
The bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the debtor directly
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.85
The court began its analysis by noting the similarity of issues
presented in Whiting Pools. Though Whiting Pools solely focused on
Chapter 11 cases,86 the Seventh Circuit recognized that the purposes of
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy are roughly the same—to allow
the debtor to reorganize his affairs while simultaneously addressing his
debts.87 Because Whiting Pools held that section 542(a) effectively
grants the estate a possessory interest in seized property, the court
found that the same rationale should apply to chapter 13 cases, and
thus held that the turnover provision compelled the dealership to return
the car to the estate.88
With the turnover issue settled, the court then pondered whether
knowingly retaining assets subject to the turnover provision could
84

Id.
Id. Appeals from the bankruptcy courts are normally heard by the district
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2010). However, if the appeal is a question of law for
which there is no controlling precedent, either the bankruptcy court or a party at
interest may request that the appeal be heard directly by the circuit court of appeals.
See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B)(i) (the bankruptcy court may ask for a direct appeal
under certain circumstances found under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i), one of which
being that “the judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law as to which
there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals . . . .”).
86
See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 211 (1983) (the
Supreme Court solely discussed the purpose of chapter 11 bankruptcy); see also
supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
87
See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (“The primary goal of reorganization
bankruptcy is to group all of the debtor’s property together in his estate such that he
may rehabilitate his credit and pay off his debts; this necessarily extends to all
property, even property seized pre-petition.”) (referencing United States v. Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203–204 (1983)); see also id. at 705 (“The principle
behind Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 is the same – allow the debtor to reorganize and
repay the majority of his debts without having to liquidate his assets.”).
88
Id. at 703–704.
85
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violate the automatic stay.89 The court looked at the plain language of
section 362(a), specifically at what it means to “exercise control” over
an asset.90 The court consulted the dictionary definition of control: “to
exercise restraining or directing influence over” or “to have power
over.”91 Noting that “[h]olding on to a debtor’s asset, refusing to return
it, and otherwise prohibiting a debtor’s beneficial use of an asset all fit
within this definition,” the court reasoned that the passive retention of
a seized asset is an act to exercise control over property of the estate
under section 362(a)(3).92
2.

The Minority View

On the other hand, the Third, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits all
compose the minority view that section 362(a)(3) does not prohibit
passively retaining an asset belonging to the estate.93 The minority
position places emphasis on the literal interpretation of the word “act”
as it appears in the statute to hold that the automatic stay only
prohibits affirmative acts to exercise control over estate property.94
That rationale also leads these courts to determine that a creditor is not
affirmatively obligated to turn over such property.95
Shortly after Fulton was decided, the Third Circuit joined the
minority approach in In re Denby-Peterson, a case with almost
89

Thompson, 566 F.3d at 704.
Id. at 702.
91
Id. (quoting Control, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th
Ed. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92
Id.
93
In re Denby–Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2019), In re Cowen, 849
F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2017)
94
See Denby–Peterson, 941 F.3d at 124–125 (consulting the dictionary to
define an “act” as, generally “something done”) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also Cowen, 849 F.2d at 949 (using the dictionary to reason that
section 362(a)(3) “stays entities from doing something to obtain possession of or
control over the estate’s property.”) (emphasis in original).
95
See, e.g., Cowen, 849 F.2d at 949 (“Stay means stay, not go.”).
90
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identical facts to those in Thompson.96 The Third Circuit first
examined, as did the Tenth Circuit, whether passively retaining an
asset constitutes an “act” under section 362(a)(3).97 After consulting
the dictionary, the court concluded that in order for there to be an
“act[,]” in violation of the stay, such act must be an “affirmative act to
exercise control over property of the estate.”98 In so doing, the court
rejected the legislative history arguments presented in Fulton, noting
that Congress did not express any intent to include passive acts within
the automatic stay’s scope.99
Finally, the Third Circuit then declined to read section 362(a)(3)
in conjunction with section 542(a), instead outlining a three-step
method for a debtor to seek turnover of seized property.100 The court
stated that all actions to recover property must be brought under an
adversary proceeding in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, and that turnover actions are not exempt from
this requirement.101 The court then noted that if a debtor could force
96

Compare Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 119–20 with Thompson v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2009).
97
Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 125; see also Cowen, 849 F.2d at 949.
98
Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 125–26 (citing Cowen, 849 F.2d at 949, United
States v. Inslaw, 932 F.2d 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
99
Id. at 127 (stating that the “legislative history fails to shed light on
Congress’s intent behind the 1984 edition of the ‘exercise control over property of
the estate’ clause.”); but see In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2019)
(declining to overrule Thompson and reiterating that the 1984 amendment
“suggested congressional intent to make the stay more inclusive by including
conduct of ‘creditors who seized an asset prepetition.’”) (quoting Thompson, 566
F.3d at 702 (citation omitted)).
100
See id. at 131 (outlining a framework for recovering seized property as: “(1)
the Chapter 13 debtor must seek court relief, such as by initiating an adversary
proceeding requesting turnover; (2) the Bankruptcy Court then determines whether
property is subject to turnover; and (3) if it is, in accordance with that determination,
the Bankruptcy Court issues a court order compelling a creditor to turn over property
to the debtor.”).
101
Id. at 129 (stating that all turnover under 542(a) is an action to recover
property under the Bankruptcy Rules) (referencing FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1)); see
also In re Cowen, 849 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is still no link
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the immediate turnover of seized property, it would temporarily
suspend any applicable affirmative defense to the turnover proceeding,
such as claiming that the seized property was not property of the
estate.102 Further, the court examined the Supreme Court’s holding in
Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf,103 which held that a bankcreditor’s failure to turnover a debt owed to the debtor upon demand
under section 542(b) was not a violation of the stay.104 Leaning on
Strumpf, the Tenth Circuit became unconvinced that section 542(a)’s
text necessarily demanded the return of property seized prepetition.105
B.

Section 362(b)(3)

Section 362(b) outlines several enumerated exceptions to the
automatic stay.106 Pertinent here is section 362(b)(3), which excludes

between [section] 542 and [section] 362.”); but see Thompson, 566 F.3d at 711
(using section 362(a)(3) in conjunction with section 542(a) to find that turnover of
estate property is self-executing), Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dept. v. Taxel (In re Del Mission
Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring debtors to prosecute a
turnover action in order to recover property “rightfully due to a bankruptcy estate is
a very real concern.”), Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773,
775 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that other creditors in the bankruptcy should not have the
financial burden associated with a turnover action of property that rightfully belongs
to the estate).
102
Id. at 129–30.
103
516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995).
104
See Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 131 (discussing Strumpf). Section 542(b)
provides that “an entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate . . . shall pay
such debt to, or on the order of, the trustee . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 542(b). Strumpf held
that section 542(b) did not command a bank-creditor to turn over a debt it owed to
the debtor so as to preserve the bank’s right to setoff under section 553. 516 U.S. at
21.
105
Id. (using Strumpf’s holding that section 542(b) did not mandate a for the
proposition that “shall deliver” in section 542(a) does not command a creditor to
deliver seized property)
106
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)-(8). Other exceptions to the stay worth
mentioning include: criminal actions against the debtor; certain actions to determine
domestic support liability; government acts to enforce a judgment, other than a
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from the stay certain post-petition actions to perfect or to maintain or
continue the perfection of a prepetition interest in property.107 The
exception applies to the holders of unperfected security interests where
applicable state law allows such interest holders to perfect their liens
or interests as of an effective date that is earlier than the date of
perfection, or “retroactive perfection.”108
The purpose and significance of the exception is best understood
by addressing its scope. The exception is limited by its companioning
provision, section 546(b), to apply only where the trustee would be
able to eradicate or “avoid” an unperfected security interest under its
“strong arm” powers under section 544(a).109 For example, suppose a
creditor enters into a security agreement with a debtor, pursuant to the
laws of a state adopting UCC Article 9, granting the creditor a lien on
some of the debtor’s property.110 Shortly thereafter, the debtor then
files for bankruptcy before the creditor is able to file the necessary
financing statement to perfect its lien. The trustee would be able to
eliminate or “avoid” this lien pursuant to section 544, which grants it
the power to avoid unperfected security interests.111 Section 362(b)(3),
money judgment, pursuant to a relevant police power; and certain actions to offset a
debts between a creditor and a debtor.
107
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3).
108
S. REP. NO. 95–989, at 86–87 (1978). For more background on perfection,
see generally Irve J. Goldman, The Effect of Bankruptcy on a Prejudgment
Attachment Lien, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32 (2014). A lien represents right
against property, and property rights are determined by state law. Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
109
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (stating the exception applies to maintain
perfection “to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b) . . . .”) (emphasis added). Section 546(b) provides
that the trustee’s avoidance power under section 544 is subject to applicable law that
permits retroactive perfection or retroactive maintenance of perfection. 11 U.S.C. §
546(b).
110
For background, see generally supra notes 10–23 and accompanying text.
111
See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a). Upon the bankruptcy filing, the trustee is
empowered with the rights of a judicial lien creditor against all estate property. Id.
Under U.C.C. Article 9, an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the interest
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therefore, allows for the creditor to file a financing statement (or other
method to perfect) its interest notwithstanding the bankruptcy, so as to
protect its interest against the trustee’s avoidance power.112
C.

In re Fulton

In 2017, Chicago–native Robbin Fulton purchased a new car in
order to transport her young child and care for her parents on
weekends.113 Three weeks later, the City impounded the car for an
outstanding citation of driving on a suspended license.114 Fulton then
filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in the Northern District of
Illinois one month later.115
Shortly after the bankruptcy court approved her Chapter 13 plan,
Fulton requested that the City return her vehicle.116 The City refused to
comply with the request and instead responded by amending its proof
of claim to include impound fees and assert a security interest in the

of a competing judicial lien creditor with respect to collateral. U.C.C. § 9–103 (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000). Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code grants the
avoidance power, while the U.C.C., a state law, determines the priority. For a greater
background on avoidance powers, see generally Richard J. Mason, Patricia K.
Smoots, When Do the Creditors’ Shoes Fit?: A Bankruptcy Estate’s Power to Assert
the Rights of a Hypothetical Judgment Creditor, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435 (2017).
112
See generally id. Without section 362(b)(3), perfecting an interest on estate
property during the bankruptcy would be a violation of the automatic stay. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (the automatic stay prohibits “any act to create, perfect, or
enforce any lien against property of the estate”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (also
prohibiting “any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement
of [the bankruptcy case].”).
113
In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2019).
114
Id. at 921.
115
In re Fulton, No. 18 BK 02860, 2018 WL 2570109, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
May 31, 2018), aff’d, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019).
116
Id. at *2.
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car.117 Fulton then moved for sanctions against the City for violating
the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) on the grounds that
Thompson required the City to turn the vehicle over to her.118
The bankruptcy court granted Fulton’s motion and required the
City to turn over Fulton’s car within one day.119 One week later, the
court denied the City’s motion for a stay pending appeal.120 The City
then appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which consolidated its appeal
with three other appeals from cases with similar facts.121
In Fulton, the City presented three grounds for appeal. First, the
City argued that Thompson was wrongly decided and should be
overruled for two reasons—passively retaining the seized cars was not
an “act” to exercise control over estate property under section
362(a)(3), and even if it were, the City contended that it was not
obliged to turn the vehicles over until their owners filed adversary
proceedings and provided adequate protection for the City’s interest.122
Second, the City argued that even if Thompson controlled, retention of
the vehicles was necessary to maintain perfection of its security
interests and is so exempted from the stay under section 362(b)(3).123
Last, the City alternatively asserted that it was exempted under section

117

Id. The City asserted a possessory lien with respect to Fulton’s car pursuant
to the Chicago Municipal Code. See generally notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
118
Id.
119
Id. at *8. Judge Schmetterer actually found that Municipal Code § 9–92–
080 did not grant the City a valid possessory interest over Fulton’s car because the
ordinance exceeds Chicago’s authority as a home-rule body. See id. at 5–6
(referencing In re Howard, 584 B.R. 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018)). This matter is
beyond the scope of this article.
120
In re Fulton, 588 B.R. 834, 835 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018).
121
In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 2019); see also In re Howard, 584
B.R. 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018); In re Peake, 588 B.R. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018);
In re Shannon, 590 B.R. 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018).
122
Fulton, 926 F.3d at 922.
123
Id. at 927.
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362(b)(4), because it retained the vehicles in an effort to enforce its
police power.124
Turning to the City’s first argument, the court quickly declined to
overrule Thompson, citing that the City gave no argument that was not
considered and subsequently rejected by the Thompson court.125 The
court similarly restated the policy interests served by the Bankruptcy
Code, noting that “the breathing room given to a debtor that attempts
to make a fresh start, and the equality of distribution of assets among
similarly situated creditors according to the priorities set forth within
the Code.”126 Notably, the court reaffirmed that its interpretation of
section 362(a)(3) was aligned with the majority view.127
On the City’s second argument, the Seventh Circuit agreed with
the lower courts in finding that the City’s passive retention practice
was not excepted under section 362(b)(3).128 In so doing, the court
looked closely at the interplay of section 362(b)(3) and section 546(b),
explaining that “the purpose of these sections is to prevent creditors
from losing their lien rights because of the bankruptcy; they do not
permit creditors to retain possession of debtors’ property.”129 The court
then rejected the City’s argument that it must retain possession of the
vehicles to maintain perfection of its purported liens.130 The court
reasoned that it was not necessary for the City to maintain possession
of the vehicles to remain a secured creditor because it could have
otherwise filed a financing statement with the Illinois Secretary of
State, thereby giving constructive notice of its “possessory lien” or

124

Id.
Id. at 924–925.
126
Id. at 925 (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2019)).
127
Fulton was decided less than two years following the Tenth Circuit’s
decision in In re Cowen.
128
Fulton, 926 F.3d at 929.
129
Id. at 928.
130
Id.
125
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security interest in the debtor’s property.131 Additionally, the court
rejected the argument that the City’s forced compliance with the
automatic stay would terminate its claimed interest.132 In so doing, the
court utilized Illinois common law to determine that involuntary loss
of possession does not extinguish a possessory lien.133
Last, the court found that the City was not exempt under section
362(b)(4).134 The court first examined the City’s retention practice
under the pecuniary purpose test, asking whether the City’s impound
laws were “designed to further the safety and welfare of Chicago
residents” and that the City only receives an “ancillary pecuniary
benefit” in the process.135 The court answered in the negative,
reasoning that by retaining the vehicles until the traffic debt was paid
in full, the City was attempting to position itself ahead of other
creditors and subvert the bankruptcy process.136 The court then found
that the impound laws also violate the public policy test.137 The court
stated that parking tickets and minor moving violations do not
implicate traditional police power regulations, which typically
implicate public health and environmental concerns.138 Rather, the
court importantly pointed out the City’s heavy reliance on collecting
parking and traffic tickets as a revenue gaining measure.139

131

Id.
Id. at 928–29.
133
Id. (referencing In re Estate of Miller, 197 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72 (1990) (“The
law respecting common law retaining liens is that the involuntary relinquishment of
retained property pursuant to a court order does not result in the loss of the lien.”)).
134
Id. at 931.
135
Id. at 929–30 (quotations in original).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 931.
138
Id.
139
Id.
132
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DISCUSSION
Overall, the Seventh Circuit decided Fulton correctly, given the
precedent set forth in Thompson and understanding the purpose and
policy goals of chapter 13 bankruptcy.
First, Fulton reaffirms the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of the
purpose of Chapter 13 bankruptcy—it operates for the benefit of all by
allowing for the debtor to reorganize his affairs and utilize postpetition income to pay his preexisting debts.140 A Chapter 13 debtor is
a fiduciary to the creditors of the bankruptcy estate, and he must be
able to utilize his estate property, including his car, for the benefit of
all. He cannot do so if the City is allowed to prefer itself by
demanding payment ahead of everyone else.141
Further illustrative here is that the Seventh Circuit, along with the
rest of the majority, understood the importance of both maximizing the
estate and minimizing its expenses. Looking at the former, a car is an
unquestionably important means of transportation for Chicagoans who
may commute to and from work. If the City were allowed to retain the
vehicles during the early stages of the bankruptcy process, these
debtors would have interim difficulties getting to work and earning
income used to pay off their debt in a payment plan. Without reliable
post-petition income, any hope of reorganization is lost, as the
bankruptcy would ultimately be dismissed.142 Therefore, the debtors
are not the only party in reliance their own income—the other
creditors are as well.

140

See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
See In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 931 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he City needs to
satisfy the debts owed to it through the bankruptcy process, as do all other
creditors.”).
142
See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6) (providing that cases can be dismissed for
material default).
141
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Second, should the debtor be forced to commence an adversary
proceeding to recover his car, it would either severely delay the return
of property rightfully belonging to the estate, or even worse, place
pressure on the debtor to pay the City immediately—a result abhorrent
to the purpose of the automatic stay.143 To hold otherwise would be
condoning the City’s practice of preferring itself to all other creditors
to the bankruptcy estate.
Despite the minority view’s criticism,144 Fulton’s interpretation of
section 362(a)(3) also preserves the text of its companion provisions—
section 542(a) and section 363(e). If a creditor could lawfully retain
possession of estate property in spite of the automatic stay, such
creditor’s burden to seek adequate protection, as imposed under
363(e), becomes rather meaningless.145 Conversely, by requiring a
creditor to return seized property upon the bankruptcy filing, the
burden to seek adequate protection remains with the creditor, just as
Whiting Pools stated.146
Though not quite as pressing as the section 362(a)(3) issue, it is
also worth noting that the Seventh Circuit correctly examined the
nature of the exception under section 362(b)(3). The City does not
need to retain possession to maintain a security interest in the
immobilized vehicles, because the trustee cannot avoid the interest
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See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943, 949 (criticizing the majority view’s
use of policy arguments and legislative history while simultaneously abstaining from
“faithful adherence to the text.”).
145
Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir.
2009)
146
See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
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https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/3
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under Illinois law.147 The City instead could also can seek a
replacement lien to adequately protect its interests.148
CONCLUSION
Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief relies heavily on equitable
principles in order to promote a fair and efficient reorganization of a
debtor’s affairs. Section 362(a)(3) works in furtherance of this goal by
maximizing the bankruptcy estate’s value and minimizing its burdens.
The Seventh Circuit correctly identified the foregoing in Fulton, and
the Supreme Court should follow suit.

147

See supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text. See also In re Estate of
Miller, 197 Ill. App. 3d 67, 72 (1990) (“The law respecting common law retaining
liens is that the involuntary relinquishment of retained property pursuant to a court
order does not result in the loss of the lien.”)
148
11 U.S.C. § 361; see also In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 929 (7th Cir. 2019).
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